81 ideas
13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
20109 | Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
23274 | World history has no room for happiness [Hegel] |
13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
23275 | The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel] |
23276 | The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel] |
23272 | The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel] |
23273 | In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel] |
23271 | The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel] |
23270 | We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |
13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |