97 ideas
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
| 5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
| 5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
| 21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
| 5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
| 5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
| 5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
| 5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
| 5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
| 5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
| 5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
| 5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
| 5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
| 5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
| 5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
| 5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
| 5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
| 5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
| 5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
| 5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
| 5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
| 19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
| 5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
| 5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
| 5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |
| 5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
| 5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
| 5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
| 5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
| 5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
| 5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
| 5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
| 5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
| 5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |