82 ideas
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
| 9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
| 9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
| 9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
| 9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
| 9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
| 9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
| 9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
| 9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
| 9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| 9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
| 9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
| 9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
| 9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
| 9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
| 9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
| 9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
| 9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
| 9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
| 9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
| 9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |