87 ideas
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
22251 | Liberalism may fail because it neglects the shared nature of what we pursue and protect [Haldane] |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |