206 ideas
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
| 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
| 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
| 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
| 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
| 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
| 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
| 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
| 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
| 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
| 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
| 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
| 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
| 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
| 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
| 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
| 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
| 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
| 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
| 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
| 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
| 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
| 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
| 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
| 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
| 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
| 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
| 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
| 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
| 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
| 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
| 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
| 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
| 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
| 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
| 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
| 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
| 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
| 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
| 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
| 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
| 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
| 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
| 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
| 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
| 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
| 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
| 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
| 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |