108 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |