105 ideas
| 3067 | A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius] |
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 3072 | Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 3066 | Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius] |
| 3071 | Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius] |
| 3069 | The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius] |
| 3065 | Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |