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All the ideas for 'From an Ontological Point of View', 'Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism' and 'fragments/reports'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil]
Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil]
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil]
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil]
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras]
There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras]
Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras]
Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras]
If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil]
Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Art leads to mental health, and mental clarity [Beardsley,M, by Carroll,N]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras]