86 ideas
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
5963 | Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |