100 ideas
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |