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All the ideas for 'From an Ontological Point of View', 'Model Theory' and 'Potentiality'

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96 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
|= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
|= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil]
Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter]
All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter]
Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter]
Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter]
A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter]
Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter]
There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter]
Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil]
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil]
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil]
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil]
Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil]