16 ideas
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
1470 | Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG] |
1471 | It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG] |
1469 | Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG] |