14 ideas
| 14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
| 14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
| 14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
| 14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
| 14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
| 14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
| 14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
| 14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
| 9567 | Maths deals with quantities of physical significance, ignoring irrelevant features [Geroch] |
| 14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
| 14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |
| 1470 | Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG] |
| 1471 | It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG] |
| 1469 | Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG] |