Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Human Condition', 'Moral Beliefs' and 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong'

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43 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]