60 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |