16 ideas
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |