Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'Action'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
6402 In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14732 A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6418 Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
21706 At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]