Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Mereology'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]