11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 16973 | Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |