Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Value Theory' and 'Lecture on Nominalism'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
21697 The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
21696 Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]