Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Euthydemus'

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13 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]