12 ideas
| 9616 | A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor] |
| 15896 | Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |