Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Elements of Intuitionism' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]