Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Formal and Material Consequence' and 'Naming and Necessity preface'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]