Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Knowledge and its Limits' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

16 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4760 Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19512 Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]