81 ideas
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |