84 ideas
| 8060 | In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre] |
| 8053 | Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre] |
| 8047 | Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre] |
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 8062 | Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre] |
| 15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
| 15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
| 15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
| 15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
| 15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
| 15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
| 15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
| 15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
| 15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
| 15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
| 15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
| 15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
| 15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
| 15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
| 15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
| 15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
| 15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
| 15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
| 15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
| 15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
| 15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
| 15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
| 15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
| 15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
| 15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
| 15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
| 15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 8052 | To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre] |
| 8057 | Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre] |
| 8054 | Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre] |
| 21050 | I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre] |
| 8056 | AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre] |
| 8059 | The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre] |
| 8034 | We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre] |
| 8036 | Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre] |
| 8049 | Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre] |
| 8045 | The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre] |
| 8051 | Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre] |
| 8048 | When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre] |
| 8035 | In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre] |
| 8037 | The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre] |
| 8040 | Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre] |
| 8042 | Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre] |
| 8058 | Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre] |
| 7097 | Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman] |
| 8043 | Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre] |
| 8061 | If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre] |
| 8038 | Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre] |
| 8050 | There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
| 8055 | If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre] |