43 ideas
23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |