16 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |