33 ideas
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
| 19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
| 19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
| 19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
| 19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
| 19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |