42 ideas
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |
1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |