Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness', 'The Search After Truth' and 'Law and Causality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16669 Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10993 Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14279 Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
6894 Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
12726 In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9418 All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
9420 Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]