Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness', 'The Character of Physical Law' and 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone]
The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone]
The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone]
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]