36 ideas
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |