Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness', 'Five Milestones of Empiricism' and 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine]
Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine]
Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]