Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'How to Make our Ideas Clear' and 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
7661 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19089 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
7660 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]