Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'There is no question of physicalism' and '64: Gryllus - on Rationality in Animals'

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20 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
1477 Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
1478 Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
1479 Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch]