19 ideas
20660 | At one level maths and nature are very similar, suggesting some deeper origin [Wolfram] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
20659 | Space and its contents seem to be one stuff - so space is the only existing thing [Wolfram] |