Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility' and 'Neutral Relations'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
15547 Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14217 The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
14216 The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
14218 A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
14219 Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
14220 Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15542 All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]