Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'Knowledge and the State of Nature' and 'After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre]