32 ideas
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
| 11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
| 11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
| 11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
| 11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
| 11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
| 11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
| 11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
| 11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
| 11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
| 11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
| 11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
| 11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
| 11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
| 11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
| 11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
| 11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 7492 | Early societies are based on community, and modern societies on association [Tönnies, by Watson] |
| 11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |