Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction' and 'Paradox without Self-Reference'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
9138 An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
20298 The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
20300 Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
20294 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey]
20293 Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey]
20297 Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey]
20301 The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey]
20302 An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey]
20303 Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
20299 If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]