48 ideas
| 21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
| 21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
| 21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
| 21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
| 21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
| 21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
| 21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |