8 ideas
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |