41 ideas
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 20420 | The emotion expressed is non-conscious, but feels oppressive until expression relieves it [Collingwood] |
| 20421 | Art exists ideally, purely as experiences in the mind of the perceiver [Collingwood, by Kemp] |
| 20406 | Art clarifies the artist's mind and feelings, thus leading to self-knowledge [Collingwood, by Davies,S] |