Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic' and 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


45 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]