29 ideas
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |