Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson' and 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8439 Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
8440 Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8441 Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
8436 Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8435 Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8437 The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
8438 A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]