26 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |