Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'When Does a Life Begin?' and 'Properties'

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20 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood]
If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood]
It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood]